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Abstract We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have
claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this
particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to
transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems.
These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and
can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions,
that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach
extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the
agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of
sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four
classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one
specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to
the river sharing problem.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have
claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. Our choice for this particular
situation is motivated by the following two examples.
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The first example is the distribution of intergenerational welfare (Arrow et al. 2004).
The agents are the generations, ordered linearly in time. Each generation is endowed
with certain resources, but also has a claim to inherit part of the resources of the previ-
ous generation. A specific problem of this kind is the climate change problem, where
each generation adds to the stock of greenhouse gases, but also makes a claim to pre-
vious generations’ mitigation efforts (Dasgupta et al. 1999; Weikard 2004; Davidson
2008).
The second example is the river sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont 2002;
Parrachino et al. 2006; Carraro et al. 2007; Ambec and Ehlers 2008). This is the topic
of this paper. In the river sharing problem, the agents are countries (or water users in
general) ordered linearly along a river. On the territory of each agent tributaries and
rainfall add water to the river. This constitutes an agent’s endowment of river flow.
Each country also has a claim to river water. These claims can be based on any of a
wide range of principles for river sharing (Wolf 1999; Daoudy 2008). Two common
principles for river sharing are absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) and absolute ter-
ritorial integrity (ATI) (Salman 2007). ATS prescribes that each agent has the right
to all water on his territory while ATI prescribes that each agent has the right to all
upstream water. Though these extreme principles are not often invoked in practice,
agents’ claims are often larger than their endowments, as illustrated for instance by
Egypt’s large claim to water in the Nile river basin. Agents’ overlapping claims to
river water make water a contested resource (Ansink and Weikard 2009).
In both examples, redistribution of the resource endowments may be desirable, for
instance when some agents have large endowments but only small claims (cf. Bossert
and Fleurbaey 1996). We exploit the linear order of agents to determine this redistri-
bution using an axiomatic approach. Using three very natural requirements, the order
of agents allows us to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent
river sharing problems that we call reduced river sharing problems. Reduced river
sharing problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems (Aumann
and Maschler 1985; Young 1987; Moulin 2002). Therefore, we can use sharing rules
from the bankruptcy literature to solve these reduced river sharing problems. In each
of these reduced problems, water rights are allocated to an agent and the set of his
downstream neighbours. As in bankruptcy problems, our proposed class of solutions—
denoted sequential sharing rules—is based on the agents’ claims. Sequential sharing
rules are constructed by the recursive application of a bankruptcy rule to the sequence
of reduced river sharing problems.
In a bankruptcy problem, a perfectly divisible resource (usually called the estate in
this literature) is to be distributed over a set of agents who have overlapping claims.
A solution to a bankruptcy problem is a sharing rule (or alternatively, a rationing
scheme), that is based on the agents’ claims to the resource. Various axiomatic
approaches to the construction of such sharing rules have been analysed (cf. Herrero
and Villar 2001; Thomson 2003).
In a river sharing problem, agents are ordered linearly, characterised by an initial
resource endowment and a claim to the resource. Claims are exogenous and may
be smaller or larger than an agent’s endowment. As in the bankruptcy problem, we
assume scarcity of the resource. River sharing problems differ from bankruptcy prob-
lems in two ways. First, there is a difference in the position of the agents. In the standard
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bankruptcy problem, all agents have equal positions. In a river sharing problem, agents
are ordered linearly, reflecting the direction of river flow. Therefore, the agents’ claims
have a sequential structure, linking the river sharing problem to bankruptcy problems
with a priority order (cf. Moulin 2000). Second, there is a difference in the initial state
of the resource. In a bankruptcy problem, the resource is initially completely separated
from the agents. In a river sharing problem, the resource is initially endowed to the
agents. This endowment of resources links our approach to reallocation problems (cf.
Fleurbaey 1994; Klaus et al. 1997). Both differences play a key role in the construction
of the class of sequential sharing rules.
There are two reasons for solving river sharing problems using bankruptcy rules.1
First, as indicated above, both types of problems have the common feature that claims
exceed the available resource. Moreover, the properties of bankruptcy rules are well
understood, hence they can easily be put to use. The second reason is pragmatic.
Many two-agent water rights disputes are solved using variants of bankruptcy rules,
for instance equal sharing or sharing proportional to some objective criterion (e.g.
population or the amount of irrigable land, see Wolf 1999). Often, these solutions are
explicitly proposed by third parties or joint river basin committees, but they can also be
the result of negotiations between the agents. This paper shows the logical extension
of such sharing rules for river sharing problems with more than two agents.
This paper makes two novel contributions. First, our approach extends the bank-
ruptcy literature to settings with a sequential (or spatial) structure of both the agents
and the resource to be shared.2 Second, we provide axiomatic foundations for a class
of solutions to the river sharing problem that satisfy some attractive properties.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce the setting of the river
sharing problem. In Sect. 3 the class of sequential sharing rules is characterised. In
Sect. 4 we apply four sequential sharing rules, based on four classical bankruptcy
rules, to a numerical example. In Sect. 5 some properties of sequential sharing rules
are assessed and we provide two characterisations of one specific rule. In Sect. 6 we
compare our approach to three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem. In
Sect. 7 we discuss the results and conclude.
2 The river sharing problem
Consider an ordered set N of n ≥ 2 agents located along a river, with agent 1 the
most upstream and n the most downstream. Agent i is upstream of j whenever i < j .
Denote by Ui = { j ∈ N : j < i} the set of agents upstream of i , and denote by
Di = { j ∈ N : j > i} the set of agents downstream of i . On the territory of i , rainfall
1 The standard approach to analyse river sharing problems is to apply non-cooperative game-theoretic
models (cf. Carraro et al. 2007; Ansink and Ruijs 2008). The merit of the axiomatic approach employed
in this paper is to complement, support and improve our understanding of the outcomes of these strategic
models.
2 Branzei et al. (2008) also analyse bankruptcy rules in a flow network. In their approach, however, the flows
are cost functions that are used to implement bankruptcy rules in a network approach. Recently, Bjørndal
and Jörnsten (2010) discussed flow sharing problems as a generalisation of bankruptcy problems, a topic
to which we return in Sect. 6.
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or inflow from tributaries increases total river flow by ei ≥ 0; e = (e1, . . . , en). River
inflow ei can be considered the endowment of i . This does not imply that agent i has
property rights to ei . Rights are assigned as a solution to a river sharing problem, as
discussed below. In addition to river inflow ei , each agent is characterised by having
a claim ci ≥ 0 to river flow; c = (c1, . . . , cn). We do not impose which portion of an
agent’s claim is directed to e1, e2, . . . , etc.
This information suffices to define our river sharing problem.
Definition 1 (River sharing problem) A river sharing problem is a triple ω =
〈N , e, c〉, with N an ordered and finite set of agents, an endowments vector e ∈ Rn+
and a claims vector c ∈ Rn+.
Denote by x = (x1, . . . , xn) the vector of allocated water rights, determined by a
sharing rule as described below. To delineate the setting of the river sharing problem,
let the total available water on the territory of agent i be denoted by
Ei ≡ ei +
∑
j∈Ui
(e j − x j ). (1)
Ei is the sum of river inflow on the territory of i and any unallocated upstream water.3
Because water is scarce, we assume that all allocated water is consumed. For the river
sharing problem to be relevant, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Downstream claims exceed downstream endowments at each location
along the river: ci + ∑ j∈Di c j ≥ ei +
∑
j∈Di e j ,∀i ∈ N .
This assumption implies that cn ≥ en . It assures that there is contested water
throughout the river or all claims are just satisfied (see Lemma 1 below).
Denote by Ω the set of relevant river sharing problems that satisfy Assumption 1.
A sharing rule allocates water rights to each agent.
Definition 2 (Sharing rule) A sharing rule is a mapping F : Ω → Rn that
assigns to every river sharing problem ω ∈ Ω a water rights allocation vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn), x ∈ Rn+, such that (a)
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei , (b) 0 ≤ x ≤ c,
and (c) xi ≤ Ei ,∀i ∈ N .
The allocation of water rights to agent i is Fi (ω) = xi . Requirement (a) of the shar-
ing rule imposes efficiency: no water rights remain unallocated. Requirement (b) says
that agents receive a non-negative allocation that is bounded by their claim. Require-
ment (c) is a feasibility constraint. Figure 1 illustrates a river sharing problem for
n = 4.
3 Characterisation of sequential sharing rules
Solutions from the bankruptcy literature cannot be directly applied to the river shar-
ing problem, because the resource is distributed over the agents. The linear order of
3 Ei depends on the allocation to upstream agents xUi . For ease of notation we do not include this allocation
as an argument of Ei .
123
Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems 191
Fig. 1 The river sharing
problem for n = 4; nodes are
agents and arrows indicate water
flows
agents along the river and the unidirectionality of river flow enable us, however, to
represent the river sharing problem as a sequence of reduced river sharing problems.
These reduced river sharing problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy
problems. They can therefore be solved using bankruptcy rules. In this section we first
define a class of rules for river sharing problems—called sequential sharing rules—
that follow this procedure. Then we characterise this class using three very natural
axioms.
Denote by cDi downstream excess claims that are defined as the sum of claims net
of endowments of all agents downstream of i :
cDi ≡
∑
j∈Di
(c j − e j ). (2)
By Assumption 1 we know that cDi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N \n. Consequently, the corresponding
downstream endowments are eDi = 0, ∀i ∈ N .
Using (2), a river sharing problem ω can be represented as a sequence (ω1, . . . , ωn)
of reduced river sharing problems ωi .
Definition 3 (Reduced river sharing problem) A reduced river sharing problem is a
triple ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , eDi ), (ci , cDi )
〉
, with two agents i and Di , endowments Ei
(recall that eDi = 0), and a claims vector (ci , cDi ).
Note that, in slight abuse of notation, we denote the second agent in the reduced
river sharing problem by Di . This set of downstream agents is treated as a single
claimant. In each reduced problem ωi , available river flow Ei is distributed between i
and Di , where the claim of Di is its downstream excess claim cDi as defined in (2).
Downstream river flow is first used to (partly) satisfy downstream claims so that only
claims in excess of downstream river flow can affect upstream water allocation.
A reduced river sharing problem is mathematically equivalent to a bankruptcy
problem.4
Definition 4 (Bankruptcy problem) A bankruptcy problem is a triple ψ = 〈N , E, c〉,
with N a finite set of agents, an endowment E ∈ R+, and a claims vector c ∈ Rn+.
Denote by Ψ the set of relevant bankruptcy problems that satisfy
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E .
Bankruptcy rules can be applied to any reduced river sharing problem.
4 That is, if we do not attribute Ei to one of the agents. In the concluding section we will discuss a difference
in interpretation.
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Definition 5 (Bankruptcy rule) A bankruptcy rule is a mapping B : Ψ → Rn
that assigns to every bankruptcy problem ψ ∈ Ψ an allocation vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn), x ∈ Rn+, such that (a)
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ei , (b) 0 ≤ x ≤ c, and (c)
for ψ ′ = 〈N ′, E, c〉 where N ′ is any permutation of N , we have Bi (ψ) = Bi (ψ ′).
Note that, slightly unconventional, requirement (c) of this definition imposes ano-
nymity of the bankruptcy rule. We add this requirement to stress that any difference
in allocation between upstream and downstream agents is not due to the preferential
treatment of agents by a particular bankruptcy rule.
In order to solve a river sharing problem, a bankruptcy rule is applied to the
sequence (ω1, . . . , ωn) of its reduced problems. Because of (1), however, the reduced
problems and their solutions are dependent on each other. Because E1 = e1 by
definition, ω1 is the only reduced problem whose outcome is independent of the
outcome of other reduced problems. Its solution—allocating x1 to agent 1—deter-
mines E2 which enables the formulation of and a solution to ω2, etc. More spe-
cifically, the procedure is as follows. Consider a river sharing problem ω and let
ω1 =
〈{1, D1}, (E1, 0), (c1, cD1)
〉
. Now we set x1 = B1(ω1) so that xD1 = E1 − x1
and therefore E2 = e1 + e2 − x1. Subsequently, let ω2 =
〈{2, D2}, (E2, 0), (c2, cD2)
〉
.
We set x2 = B2(ω2) so that xD2 = E2 − x2 and so on.
An obvious requirement for this procedure to work is that in each reduced river
sharing problem the sum of claims exceeds the available river flow so that the problem
belongs to the set of relevant problems. This relevance is established in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 For any river sharing problem ω ∈  and under any sharing rule F each
reduced river sharing problem ωi is a relevant problem such that the sum of claims
(weakly) exceeds available water: ci + cDi ≥ Ei , ∀i ∈ N.
Proof The proof is by induction. The inductive hypothesis is to show that the lemma
holds for i = 1. First, notice that using (2), Assumption 1 can be rearranged to
ci + cDi ≥ ei , ∀i ∈ N . (3)
Now consider the first reduced problem ω1 of river sharing problem ω. By (3) we have
c1 + cD1 ≥ e1 = E1 so that for ω1 claims exceed available water.
The inductive step is to show that if the lemma holds for i , then it also holds for
i + 1. Requirement (b) of Definition 2 is that x ≤ c so that xDi ≤ cDi . Because (1)
implies Ei+1 = ei+1 + xDi we have
Ei+1 ≤ ei+1 + cDi . (4)
Using (2) the RHS of (4) can be rewritten as ei+1 + cDi = ci+1 + cDi+1 . This implies
that ci+1 + cDi+1 ≥ Ei+1 so that for ωi+1, claims (weakly) exceed available water.
This completes the proof. unionsq
Lemma 1 assures that—analogous to Assumption 1—each reduced river sharing
problem is a relevant river sharing problem according to Definition 1. Therefore, a
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sharing rule assigns to every reduced river sharing problem ωi a water rights allocation
vector x = (xi , xDi ), such that xi + xDi = Ei .
Given Lemma 1, the sequence of reduced problems can be solved recursively in
the linear order of agents along the river. Now we are able to define sequential sharing
rules.
Definition 6 (Sequential sharing rule) A sequential sharing rule for river sharing
problem ω is a sharing rule F that allocates to each agent the allocation provided by
repeatedly applying a bankruptcy rule B to its corresponding sequence of reduced
river sharing problems (ω1, . . . , ωn), so that Fi (ω) = Bi (ωi ),∀i ∈ N .
Using sequential sharing rules, the water rights allocated to each agent are equal
to the allocation provided by the recursive solution of its corresponding sequence of
reduced problems. Given the vectors of claims and endowments, the allocation to
agent i is therefore independent of the number of agents in Di , the distribution of
their claims (ci+1, . . . , cn) and the distribution of their endowments (ei+1, . . . , en);
only the difference between aggregate claims
∑
j∈Di c j and endowments
∑
j∈Di e j
matters.
For the characterisation of sequential sharing rules, consider the following three
axioms.
Only n’s Excess Claim Matters: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N , e′, c′〉 such that e′ = (e1, . . . , en−1, e′n) and c′ =
(c1, . . . , cn−1, c′n) with e′n = 0 and c′n = cn − en , we have Fi (ω) = Fi (ω′),∀i ∈ N .
This axiom requires that allocation of upstream contested water is independent of
the part of the claim of agent n that can be satisfied with the endowment of agent n. In
other words, only n’s excess claim cn −en is effective (by Assumption 1, cn −en ≥ 0).
This is a mild requirement, because n is not confronted with any claims from down-
stream agents. In addition, there is no alternative use for en than to allocate it to n;
endowment en is uncontested. Hence, it is very natural that en is used to partially
satisfy cn .
No Advantageous Downstream Merging: For each river sharing problem ω =
〈N , e, c〉, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N ′, e′, c′〉 such that N ′ =N\{n} and
e′ = (e1, . . . , en−2, e′n−1) and c′ = (c1, . . . , cn−2, c′n−1), with e′n−1 = en−1 + en
and c′n−1 = cn−1 + cn , we have Fi (ω) = Fi (ω′), ∀i < n − 2.
This property pertains to the possibility that agents n − 1 and n consolidate their
claims and endowments and present themselves as a single claimant. The axiom pre-
scribes that the allocation to upstream agents is not affected by such behaviour. Note
that the axiom is similar in spirit to the No Advantageous Merging or Splitting axiom
(O’Neill 1982; Thomson 2003). 5
Upstream Consistency: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, each i ∈
N \ {1}, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N ′, e′, c′〉 such that N ′ = N \ {1}, c′ =
(c2, . . . , cn), and e′ = (e1 − x1 + e2, e3, . . . , en), we have Fi (ω′) = Fi (ω).
This property requires that when player 1 leaves with his allocation, the truncated
game gives the same allocation as the original game to the remaining players. This is
5 This axiom cannot be directly applied in our setting as we analyse problems where agents are ordered,
but see Proposition 3.
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a natural and straightforward requirement as any excess water not allocated to agent
1, e1 − x1, is available to the second agent.
Jointly, these three axioms characterise the class of sequential sharing rules.
Proposition 1 A sharing rule for river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 satisfies Only
n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging and Upstream
Consistency if and only if it is a sequential sharing rule.
Proof First we show that a sequential sharing rule satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim
Matters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging and Upstream Consistency. Only
n’s Excess Claim Matters is satisfied by construction of the reduced problem ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , 0), (ci ,∑ j∈Di (c j − e j ))〉. Obviously, F(ωi ) depends only on the last
agent’s excess claim, not on cn or en in isolation. Hence, for any sequential sharing rule
also F(ω) = F(〈N , (e1, . . . , en−1, 0), (c1, . . . , cn−1, cn − en)〉). No Advantageous
Downstream Merging is satisfied because in every reduced game F(ωi ) depends only
on the aggregate downstream excess claim
∑
j∈Di (c j − e j ). Downstream merging
does not affect this aggregate claim. Upstream Consistency is satisfied because by
(1), E2 = e2 + e1 − x1 and E2 is the relevant endowment for the truncated problem
〈N \ {1}, (c2, . . . , cn), (e1 − x1 + e2, e3, . . . , en)〉.
Next we show that any sharing rule F that satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters,
No Advantageous Downstream Merging and Upstream Consistency is a sequential
sharing rule. Consider river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 and its solution F(ω).
To establish that F1(ω) = F1(ω1) we apply No Advantageous Downstream Merg-
ing to player 1. We have F1(ω) = F1
(
〈{1, D1}, (e1,∑ j∈D1 e j ), (c1,
∑
j∈D1 c j )〉
)
.
From this, by repeated application of Only n’s Excess Claim Matters we have
F1(ω) = F1
(
〈{1, D1}, (e1, 0), (c1,∑ j∈D1(c j − e j )〉
)
= F1(ω1). To establish that
F2(ω) = F2(ω2) we apply No Advantageous Downstream Merging to player 2.
We have F2(ω) = F2
(
〈{1, 2, D2}, (e1, e2,∑ j∈D2 e j ), (c1,
∑
j∈D2 c j )〉
)
. From this,
by repeated application of Only n’s Excess Claim Matters we have F(ω) =
F
(
〈{1, 2, D2}, (e1, e2, 0), (c1, c2,∑ j∈D2(c j − e j )〉
)
. Using Upstream Consistency
and F1(ω) = x1, we know that F2(ω) = F2(ω2). By repeating this procedure for
agents 3, . . . , n − 1, using recursive application of Upstream Consistency, we obtain
F(ω) = (F1(ω1), . . . , Fn(ωn)) which completes the proof. unionsq
Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging and
Upstream Consistency characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. In the next
sections we focus on four classical bankruptcy rules and assess some properties of
their corresponding sequential sharing rules.
4 Application
In this section we apply four sequential sharing rules, based on four classical bank-
ruptcy rules, to an illustrative river sharing problem. The four classical bankruptcy
rules are the proportional rule, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses and
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the Talmud rule (Herrero and Villar 2001). In our notation for two-agent problems,
the definitions of the four rules are as follows.
Proportional rule (PRO): For all ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , 0), (ci , cDi )
〉
, there exists λ>0,
such that xPROi = λci and xPRODi = λcDi .
PRO assigns each agent a share of the resource in proportion to the agents’ claims.
Constrained equal awards (CEA): For all ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , 0), (ci , cDi )
〉
, there
exists λ > 0, such that xCEAi = min{ci , λ} and xCEADi = min{cDi , λ}.
CEA assigns each agent an equal share of the resource, subject to no agent receiving
more than his claim.
Constrained equal losses (CEL): For all ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , 0), (ci , cDi )
〉
, there
exists λ > 0, such that xCELi = max{0, ci − λ} and xCELDi = max{0, cDi − λ}.
CEL assigns each agent a share of the resource such that their losses compared to
their claims are equal, subject to no agent receiving a negative share.
Talmud rule (TAL): For all ωi =
〈{i, Di }, (Ei , 0), (ci , cDi )
〉
, there exists λ > 0,
such that
xTALi =
{
min
{ 1
2 ci , λ
}
if Ei ≤ 12
(
ci + cDi
)
,
ci − min
{ 1
2 ci , λ
}
otherwise,
xTALDi =
{
min
{ 1
2 cDi , λ
}
if Ei ≤ 12
(
ci + cDi
)
,
cDi − min
{ 1
2 cDi , λ
}
otherwise.
TAL assigns each agent his uncontested share of the resource and divides the con-
tested part equally.
As discussed in Sect. 1, many two-agent water rights disputes are solved using vari-
ants of bankruptcy rules. The practice of sharing water proportional to some objective
criterion corresponds to the application of PRO in case that the agents’ claims are
based on the same principle for water sharing. CEA corresponds to equal sharing
when claims are sufficiently high, whereas CEL corresponds to equal sharing when
claims are equal. The principles of ATS and ATI are approximated in situations where
the upstream agent has either a very high or very low claim compared to the down-
stream agent, for any of these four classical rules.
To illustrate how a solution to the river sharing problem is calculated, Table 1 shows
the steps to the solution to a river sharing problem for n = 4 and using PRO. In this
example, the values chosen for e and c illustrate a river sharing problem in which the
major share of river flow originates on the territory of agent 1, while the largest claim
is made by agent 4.
In Table 1, the river sharing problem is described by the first three columns that
represent the set of agents N and the vectors e and c. The first reduced river sharing
problem is ω1 =
〈{1, D1}, (E1, 0), (c1, cD1)
〉
, with two agents, 1 and D1, who have
claims (c1, cD1), to the resource E1. E1 = 80 is calculated using (1) and cD1 = 90 is
calculated using (2). The solution using PRO yields x = (29, 51). This solution (i.e.
xD1 = 51) is used as input for the second reduced river sharing problem ω2 and so on.
The last column of Table 1 provides values for pi ≡ xi/ci : the proportion of agent i’s
claim that is allocated to him. This column shows that the sequential sharing rule based
on PRO generates a solution with different values for pi . In a bankruptcy problem,
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Table 1 Example of the calculation of x using PRO
i ei ci cDi ⇒ Ei ⇒ xPROi xPRODi ⇒ p
PRO
i
1 80 50 90 80 29 51 0.57
2 10 10 90 61 6 55 0.61
3 10 20 80 65 13 52 0.65
4 10 90 – 62 62 – 0.69
Table 2 Comparison of solutions for three different combinations of claims and endowments of river
flow
i ei ci ⇒ xPROi pPROi xCEAi pCEAi xCELi pCELi xTALi pTALi
Case 1
1 80 50 29 0.57 40 0.80 20 0.40 25 0.50
2 10 10 6 0.61 10 1.00 0 0.00 5 0.50
3 10 20 13 0.65 20 1.00 10 0.50 10 0.50
4 10 90 62 0.69 40 0.44 80 0.89 70 0.78
Case 2
1 80 50 25 0.50 40 0.80 10 0.20 25 0.50
2 10 30 16 0.54 25 0.83 10 0.33 15 0.50
3 10 20 12 0.59 18 0.88 10 0.50 10 0.50
4 10 90 57 0.63 28 0.31 80 0.89 60 0.67
Case 3
1 80 50 33 0.67 40 0.80 30 0.60 30 0.60
2 30 10 8 0.77 10 1.00 0 0.00 5 0.50
3 10 20 16 0.79 20 1.00 15 0.75 13 0.63
4 10 90 73 0.81 60 0.67 85 0.94 83 0.92
PRO would yield a constant value for pi . This difference illustrates that accounting
for the linear order of agents and their endowments indeed affects the solution to the
river sharing problem.
Table 2 continues on the example given in Table 1 by comparing solutions for
three different combinations of claims and endowments of river flow, for the four
rules described above. It illustrates how changes in claims or endowments affect the
different solutions. In case 2 of Table 2, c2 increases from 10 to 30 compared with
case 1. This increase in claims of agent 2 causes an increase in x2, as illustrated by
PRO (6 → 16), CEA (10 → 25), CEL (0 → 10), and TAL (5 → 15). This Claims
Monotonicity property is further examined in Sect. 5. In case 3 of Table 2, e2 increases
from 10 to 30 compared with case 1. This increase in endowment of agent 2 causes an
increase in x for all agents, as illustrated by PRO ((29, 6, 13, 62) → (33, 8, 16, 73)),
and can be verified for the other three rules too. This Resource Monotonicity property
is also further examined in Sect. 5.
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5 Properties
In this section we first assess the properties of sequential sharing rules, focusing on
the four rules introduced in the previous section. Subsequently we provide two char-
acterisation results for the sequential river sharing rule based on PRO.
For the assessment of properties, we consider two monotonicity properties and two
of the characterising properties of the class of priority rules used by Moulin (2000).
When a bankruptcy rule satisfies a property, this does not necessarily imply that its
corresponding sequential sharing rule also satisfies this property. For some properties,
however, the implication does hold. Some of these are appealing properties for the
setting of a river sharing problem, including the following two monotonicity proper-
ties. Note that all properties in this section are first defined in their standard form for
bankruptcy problems and subsequently in their corresponding form for river sharing
problems, indicated by .
Claims monotonicity: For each bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , E, c〉, each i ∈ N ,
and each related problem ψ ′ = 〈N , E, c′i , c−i
〉
such that c′i > ci , we have Bi (ψ ′) ≥
Bi (ψ).
Claims monotonicity: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, each i ∈ N ,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N , e, c′i , c−i
〉
such that c′i > ci , we have Fi (ω′) ≥
Fi (ω).
This property says that any agent i should not be worse off with a larger claim.
Resource monotonicity: For each bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , E, c〉, each i ∈ N ,
and each related problem ψ ′ = 〈N , E ′, c〉 such that E ′ ≥ E , we have B(ψ ′) ≥ B(ψ).
Resource monotonicity: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, each i ∈ N ,
and each related problem ω′ = 〈N , e′i , e−i , c
〉
such that e′i ≥ ei , we have F(ω′) ≥
F(ω).
This property says that no agent should be worse off when some agent has a larger
endowment. No agent loses regardless of his position along the river.
Moulin (2000) characterises a class of priority rules for bankruptcy problems with
a priority order, which is related to our approach (see Sect. 6.2). The four character-
ising properties that he employs are Upper Composition, Lower Composition, Scale
Invariance and Consistency. The first two of these are difficult to re-define for use
in the river sharing problem. Scale Invariance and Consistency can be re-defined and
we will see that Consistency can be satisfied, while Scale Invariance is satisfied
by sequential sharing rules that are based on any bankruptcy rule that satisfies Scale
Invariance.
Scale invariance: For each bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , E, c〉, each i ∈ N , all
λ ≥ 0, and each related problem ψ ′ = 〈N , λE, λc〉, we have B(ψ ′) = λB(ψ).
Scale invariance: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, each i ∈ N , all
λ ≥ 0, and each related problem ω′ = 〈N , λe, λc〉, we have F(ω′) = λF(ω).
This property says that a rescaling of endowments and claims (or a change of the
unit in which they are measured) does not affect the solution.
Consistency: For each bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , E, c〉, each i, j ∈ N , i = j ,
and each related problem ψ ′ = 〈N \ { j}, E − B j (〈N , E, c〉), c− j
〉
, we have Bi (ψ ′) =
Bi (ψ).
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This property says that agents receive the same allocation whether or not a subset of
N has left with their allocation. The definition of Consistency requires some explana-
tion. Following Moulin (2000), let the leaving subset be a single agent j ∈ N . Denote
by ω the river sharing problem including j and denote by ω′ the river sharing problem
where j has left. Agent j leaves by eliminating the j th element from both the set of
players and the claims vector. Because agent j leaves with his allocation x j = Fj (ω),
this amount has to be deducted from the endowments vector e. The problem is to
find a suitable new endowments vector e′ that satisfies the efficiency and feasibility
requirements of Definition 2. The vector difference e − e′ can then be regarded as the
contribution of each agent’s endowment to the allocation of water rights to agent j .
Formally:
Consistency: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, each i, j ∈ N , i =
j , and each related problem ω′ = 〈N ′, e′, c′〉 such that N ′ = N \ { j}, c′ = c \
{c j }, and e′ =
(
e′1, . . . , e′j−1, e′j+1, . . . , e′n
)
, with
∑
i≤k
(
e′i − ei
) ≤ 0 ∀k < j and
∑
k∈N ′
(
e′k − ek
) = e j − Fj (ω), we have Fi (ω′) = Fi (ω).
Note that Consistency differs from Upstream Consistency introduced in Sect. 3 in
that it applies to any agent in the river, not just the upstream agent.
In order to introduce the next proposition we need one additional property. This is
the Linked Monotonicity property, which is the dual of Claims Monotonicity (Moreno-
Ternero and Villar 2006):
Linked Monotonicity: For each bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , E, c〉, each i ∈
N , each α ∈ R+, and a related problem ψ ′ = 〈N , E + α, (ci + α, c−i )〉, we have
Bi (ψ ′) − Bi (ψ) ≤ α.
This property says that if an agent’s claim and the resource increase by the same
amount α, then this agent’s allocation should not increase by more than α. The fol-
lowing proposition covers the axioms discussed so far in this section.
Proposition 2 The following relations between the properties of bankruptcy rules and
their corresponding sequential sharing rules hold:
(a) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity,
then its corresponding sequential sharing rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity.
(b) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity, Resource Monotonicity and
Linked Monotonicity, then its corresponding sequential sharing rule satisfies
Resource Monotonicity.
(c) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Scale Invariance, then its corresponding sequential
sharing rule satisfies Scale Invariance.
(d) If a bankruptcy rule satisfies Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity,
then there exists an endowments vector e′ such that its corresponding sequential
sharing rule satisfies Consistency.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Recall that when a rule satisfies a property, its dual rule satisfies its dual property.
Because PRO and TAL are self-dual and CEA and CEL are duals of each other, and
all satisfy Claims Monotonicity, we know that they all satisfy its dual property, Linked
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Monotonicity. Because PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL also satisfy Resource Monotonic-
ity and Scale Invariance (Moulin 2002; Thomson 2003), Proposition 2 leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary Sequential sharing rules based on PRO, CEA, CEL and TAL satisfy Claims
Monotonicity, Resource Monotonicity, Scale Invariance and Consistency (for
some feasible and efficient endowment vector e′).
Note that Proposition 2 implies that to satisfy Consistency, a sequential sharing
rule need not be based on a bankruptcy rule that satisfies Consistency. The construc-
tion of sequential sharing rules assures that every bankruptcy rule that satisfies Claims
Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity, has a corresponding sequential sharing rule
that satisfies Consistency for some feasible and efficient endowments vector e′.
In addition to the standard bankruptcy properties, the structure of the river allows
to identify additional properties, tailored to this structure. One such property relates
to an agent’s position in the order of agents and how this affects his allocation.
Location Monotonicity: For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 and each
i, j ∈ N such that i < j , if ci = c j then Fi (ω) ≤ Fj (ω).
Inspired by the ATI principle discussed in Sect. 1, this property says that if two
agents i, j ∈ N with i < j have equal claims, then i should not obtain more than j .
This property implies that, given equal claims, downstream agents receive a weakly
larger proportion of their claims than upstream agents. Note that, due to unidirectional
river flow, a reverse property saying that upstream agents receive a larger allocation
may be infeasible.
Another property relates sequential sharing rules to bankruptcy rules for cases
where this is applicable.
Bankruptcy equivalence: Consider a sequential sharing rule F based on bankruptcy
rule B. For each river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 such that ei = 0,∀i > 1, i.e.
e = (e1, 0, . . . , 0), and each related bankruptcy problem ψ = 〈N , e1, c〉, we have
Fi (ω) = Bi (ψ), ∀i ∈ N .
This property says that when all water is located at the source of the river, then
the allocation provided by the sequential sharing rule is equivalent to the allocation
provided by direct application of the bankruptcy rule it is based on. An implication
of this property is that any differences in allocation between sequential sharing rules
and the bankruptcy rules they are based on, must be due to individual endowments,
not purely to the order of agents.
Using the above properties, we provide two characterisations of the sequential
sharing rule based on PRO.
Proposition 3
(a) A sharing rule for a river sharing problem satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim
Matters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging, Upstream Consistency and
Location Monotonicity if and only if it is the sequential sharing rule based on
PRO.
(b) A sharing rule for a river sharing problem satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Mat-
ters, No Advantageous Downstream Merging, Upstream Consistency and Bank-
ruptcy Equivalence if and only if it is the sequential sharing rule based on PRO.
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Proof See Appendix. unionsq
This proposition presents two characterisations based on adding just one additional
constraint to the class of sequential sharing rules. These constraints are based on two
intuitive properties for the case of river sharing. In part (a) of Proposition 3, this prop-
erty is that downstream agents receive larger proportions of their claims. In part (b)
this property is that the order of agents is irrelevant for the solution in cases where
river sharing is directly equivalent to bankruptcy. Note that the two properties are
conceptually distinct as Location Monotonicity stresses the importance of the agents’
order, while Bankruptcy Equivalence limits the importance of this order. Given this
conceptual difference, it is quite remarkable that the two properties lead to the same
river sharing rule.
6 Comparison to three alternative solutions
In this section, we compare our solution to three alternative solutions that can be
applied to river sharing problems. The first of these applies bankruptcy rules directly
to river sharing problems, while treating endowments and the linear order as a feasi-
bility constraint. The second solution is similar in spirit to the class of priority rules
constructed by Moulin (2000). The third solution is the one proposed by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002).
Although each of these solutions possesses some attractive features, they also have
disadvantages compared to the approach presented in this paper. The first solution
does not allow for differential treatment of agents that have equal claims but different
endowments. The second solution strongly favours upstream agents, while the third
solution strongly favours downstream agents.
6.1 Constrained direct application of bankruptcy rules
Constrained direct application of bankruptcy rules treats both the linear order of agents
and their individual endowments as constraints to the application of bankruptcy rules
to a river sharing problem. This approach is an attractive solution in the sense that it
treats the river sharing problem as a bankruptcy problem to the largest extent possible.
It is used by ˙Ilkiliç and Kayı (2009), who model allocation rules in a network structure
(see also Bergantiños and Sanchez 2002).
For example, directly applying CEA to the river sharing problem would give every
agent an equal allocation, constrained only by their claim and by the feasibility of this
allocation due to location and endowments. If feasible, two agents with equal claims
therefore receive the same water allocation, irrespective of their location in the basin.
Because the order of agents and their endowments are treated as a feasibility constraint
only, this approach preserves Equal Treatment of Equals when possible, and ignores
the differences in location of the agents.
Using the class of sequential sharing rules proposed in this paper, the Equal Treat-
ment of Equals property is not necessarily satisfied. Two agents with equal claims
and endowments may end up with different allocations, even if an equal allocation
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would be feasible. This difference is driven by the agents’ position in the linear order
of agents and depends on the sequential sharing rule that is applied. With sequential
sharing rules, the position in the linear order does not just constrain the set of possi-
ble solutions, but assigns significance to both location and individual endowments of
water.
6.2 Priority rule in the spirit of Moulin (2000)
As discussed in Sect. 5, the class of priority rules constructed by Moulin (2000), is
related to our approach. In fact, the bankruptcy problem studied in Moulin (2000),
including an ordered set of agents, is a special case of the river sharing problem. The
ordering of agents is according to a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary
relation, which is equivalent to the linear order in our approach. In our notation, the
priority rules satisfy:
∀i, j ∈ N with i < j, if x j > 0, then xi = ci .
In words, priority rules allocate water rights to upstream agents until their claim is
met in full, before the next agent is served.
Again, as in the previous approach, we have to treat the endowments and linear
order of the agents as a feasibility constraint. Hence, when ci > Ei , agent j = i +1 is
allocated a positive amount of water rights only when e j is positive. This approach is
an extreme rule in the sense that it strongly favours upstream agents over downstream
agents.
6.3 Sharing a river based on Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
Recently, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) proposed an axiomatic solution that is based
on ATS and ATI, as discussed in Sect. 1. These two principles are used as a lower bound
and aspiration upper bound to the welfare of a coalition of agents, with welfare origi-
nating from water and side payments. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) show that there is a
unique welfare distribution that provides a compromise between these two principles:
water is allocated such that each agent’s welfare equals his marginal contribution to
a coalition composed of all upstream agents (see also Herings et al. 2007). Note that
this so-called downstream incremental distribution is in terms of welfare while we
follow the bankruptcy literature by having a solution in terms of the resources to be
distributed.
Comparison of the downstream incremental distribution with the class of sequential
sharing rules is possible when we consider a recent extension of Ambec and Sprumont
(2002) to the case of satiable agents. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) model the river shar-
ing game for the case where each agent has a single-peaked preference function over
water and show that the downstream incremental distribution extends to this setting.
The bliss points of these functions can be interpreted as the agents’ claims. If we fur-
ther assume that agents’ marginal benefits are identical and constant up to their bliss
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point,6 then the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and
Ehlers (2008) falls in the class of sequential sharing rules. In fact, it is rather extreme
by allocating water such that xi = min{ei , ci },∀i ∈ N . This solution allocates to each
agent the rights to his own endowment, constrained only by his claim. Note, though,
that this rule violates the anonymity requirement of Definition 5 and it may also violate
the efficiency requirement of Definition 2.
This approach may be an attractive compromise of ATS and ATI but we question
its applicability for two reasons. First, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) find a solution to
the river sharing problem using a combination of lower and upper bounds to welfare.
Uniqueness of this solution follows by construction because of the implicit assumption
that lower and upper bounds coincide for the most upstream agent. In other words, it is
assumed that the most upstream agent does not aspire a higher welfare level than what
he can secure himself. This assumption is driving the solution. Second, the solution
by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream
agents which is not very convincing, as noted by Van den Brink et al. (2007), Houba
(2008) and Khmelnitskaya (2010).
7 Discussion and conclusion
As indicated in footnote 4, a remaining issue to discuss is whether a reduced river
sharing problem, although mathematically equivalent to a bankruptcy problem, can
indeed be interpreted as such. The answer to this question depends on the interpre-
tation of Ei , the resource that is to be distributed between i and Di . In a bankruptcy
problem, the resource is separated from the agents. In a reduced river sharing problem,
Ei is the river flow available to agent i . If we do not consider claims, this endowment
could be interpreted as agent i’s “property rights” (as in the Walrasian framework and
as in the ATS principle, see Sect. 1 ). The redistribution of water is then equivalent to
the redistribution of the property rights to water.
In our interpretation, overlapping claims imply that endowments do not constitute
property rights. Thus, a sharing rule is needed to introduce such rights in the first place.
Ei is not interpreted as a property right, but as a resource whose level may influence
the solution to a river sharing problem, depending on the sharing rule used. In this
case, Ei is separated from the agents and, hence, a reduced river sharing problem is
fully equivalent to a bankruptcy problem. Although this interpretation gives additional
support to the use of sequential sharing rules, we do not claim this interpretation to be
more convincing than the alternative. We leave it to the reader to judge the merits of
both interpretations.
In this paper we analyse a river sharing problem with linearly ordered agents who
have resource endowments and claims to this resource. We construct and characterise
the class of sequential sharing rules by transforming the river sharing problem to a
sequence of reduced river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathemati-
cally equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using bankruptcy
rules. This approach for solving river sharing problems contrasts with alternative
6 Ambec and Ehlers (2008) assume strictly increasing and strictly concave benefits of water use.
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approaches by allowing agents’ position in the order of agents and their endowment
to play an important role in the solution. A solution to a river sharing problem is deter-
mined by the combination of endowments and claims and the selected bankruptcy
rule.7
The results of this paper can be readily adopted for application in negotiations on
national or international river sharing problems. The approach to be followed is to
jointly agree on a bankruptcy rule to allocate water rights to the most upstream agent,
who then leaves the negotiation table with his allocation. The same rule is then used
sequentially to allocate water rights to the other agents.
A remaining question is whether this negotiation procedure has any credible non-
cooperative foundations. The n-player “sequential share bargaining” procedure, pro-
posed by Herings and Predtetchinski (2007) appears to be a promising approach.
Sequential share bargaining is an n-player extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargain-
ing model, in which the players’ shares are determined sequentially according to a
fixed order, and require unanimous agreement. Its resemblance to sequential sharing
rules is apparent. A complete analysis of this implementation, however, is left for
future work.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof We prove each part of the proposition separately.
(a) Claims Monotonicity
We have to prove that Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity of a bankruptcy
rule imply Claims Monotonicity of its corresponding sequential sharing rule.
Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, and a related problem ω′ =〈
N , e, (c′i , c−i )
〉
such that c′i > ci .
If i = 1, then by Claims Monotonicity we have x ′1 ≥ x1.
If i > 1, then in any reduced problem ω′j with j < i , we have c′D j = cD j +c′i −ci >
cD j . Note that, because Ei = Ei−1 + ei − xi−1 and Ei−1 = xi−1 + xDi−1 , we can
rewrite (1) as
Ei = ei + xDi−1 . (A1)
We proceed in two steps.
7 Two related approaches are the following. Goetz et al. (2008) apply sequential sharing rules to irrigation
water allocation. The domain of their paper is different, however, as they focus on strategy-proof rules for
situations with single-peaked preferences and, unlike Klaus et al. (1997), no initial endowments. Coram
(2006) implements a sequential bidding game to allocate water. This approach also assigns an important
role to agents’ endowments and their location in the river, but its scope is clearly different from ours.
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Step (i) In reduced problem ω1 we have c′D1 > cD1 . By Claims Monotonicity this
implies x ′D1 ≥ xD1 , and by (A1) we obtain E ′2 ≥ E2.
Step (ii) In reduced problem ω2 we have c′D2 > cD2 and E ′2 ≥ E2. By Claims
Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity jointly this implies x ′D2 ≥ xD2
and by (A1) we obtain E ′3 ≥ E3.
Step (ii) can be repeated so that for all j < i , we have x ′D j ≥ xD j . By (A1) we obtain
E ′i ≥ Ei . In reduced problem ωi we now have c′i > ci and E ′i ≥ Ei . By Claims
Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity jointly this implies x ′i ≥ xi . It follows that
c′i > ci ⇒ Fi (ω′) ≥ Fi (ω).
(b) Resource Monotonicity.
We have to prove that Claims Monotonicity, Resource Monotonicity and Linked Mono-
tonicity of a bankruptcy rule imply Resource Monotonicity of its corresponding
sequential sharing rule.
Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 and a related problem ω′ =〈
N , (e′i , e−i ), c
〉
such that e′i ≥ ei . We proceed in four steps:
(i) we first prove that E ′j ≤ E j ∀ j < i with E j − E ′j ≤ e′i − ei ,
(ii) we then prove that E ′i ≥ Ei with E ′i − Ei ≤ e′i − ei . Subsequently, we use (i)
and (ii) to prove that
(iii) x ′j ≥ x j for all j ≥ i , and
(iv) x ′j ≥ x j for all j < i .
Step (i) In any reduced problem ω′j with j < i , we have c′D j = cD j − e′i +
ei ≤ cD j . By Linked Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity, we have
xD1 − x ′D1 ≤ cD1 − c′D1 = e′i − ei and by (A1) we obtain E2 − E ′2 =
xD1 −x ′D1 ≤ e′i −ei . Again, by Linked Monotonicity and Resource Mono-
tonicity, we have xD2 − x ′D2 ≤ cD2 −c′D2 = e′i −ei and by (A1) we obtain
E3 − E ′3 = xD2 − x ′D2 ≤ e′i − ei . This argument can be repeated to find
that E ′j ≤ E j ∀ j < i , with E j − E ′j ≤ e′i − ei .
Step (ii) From step (i) we have obtained that xDi−1 − x ′Di−1 ≤ cDi−1 − c′Di−1 =
e′i −ei , which by rearrangement gives x ′Di−1 ≥ xDi−1 +ei −e′i . By substi-
tuting this inequality into (A1) we obtain
E ′i = e′i + x ′Di−1
≥ e′i + xDi−1 + ei − e′i
= xDi−1 + ei
= Ei .
Hence E ′i ≥ Ei , and because xDi−1 − x ′Di−1 ≤ e′i − ei we know that
E ′i − Ei ≤ e′i − ei .
Step (iii) We now establish that x ′j ≥ x j for all j ≥ i . Consider reduced prob-
lems ωi and ω′i . These problems are equal in terms of claims because
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c′i = ci and c′Di = cDi . They differ, however, in resources as we have just
established that E ′i ≥ Ei . Hence, by Resource Monotonicity x ′i ≥ xi and
x ′Di ≥ xDi , and by (A1) we obtain E ′i+1 ≥ Ei+1. This argument can be
repeated to find that x ′j ≥ x j ,∀ j ≥ i .
Step (iv) The last step is to establish that x ′j ≥ x j for all j < i . Because in step (ii)
we have shown that E ′i ≥ Ei with E ′i−Ei ≤ e′i−ei , and because of the effi-
ciency requirement in Definition 2, we know that 0 ≤ ∑ij=1(x ′j − x j ) ≤
e′i − ei . In words, agents upstream of i divide a surplus weakly smaller
than e′i − ei . The question is now how this surplus is divided. Writing out
(1), we have
E j = Ei − ei + x j −
i−1∑
k= j+1
(ek − xk).
Using E ′j ≤ E j from step (i) by substitution:
E ′i − e′i + x ′j −
i−1∑
k= j+1
(e′k − x ′k) ≤ Ei − ei + x j −
i−1∑
k= j+1
(ek − xk)
⇒ (E ′i − Ei ) − (e′i − ei ) ≤
i−1∑
k= j
(xk − x ′k) (as e′k = ek)
⇒
i−1∑
k= j
(x ′k − xk) ≤ (e′i − ei ) − (E ′i − Ei ), (A2)
where the RHS denotes the surplus to be divided and the LHS is the summed difference
in allocations from agent j downstream to i − 1.
For j = 1 we can now establish that, by efficiency, (A2) holds with equality. That
is, the complete surplus is divided by agents 1 to i − 1. Therefore:
i−1∑
k=2
(x ′k − xk) ≤
i−1∑
k=1
(x ′k − xk) = (e′i − ei ) − (E ′i − Ei ).
Hence, x ′1 ≥ x1. Because x ′1 ≥ x1, the surplus to be divided by agents 2 to i − 1 is
now (e′i − ei ) − (E ′i − Ei ) − (x ′1 − x1).
For j = 2 we can thus establish that:
i−1∑
k=3
(x ′k − xk) ≤
i−1∑
k=2
(x ′k − xk) = (e′i − ei ) − (E ′i − Ei ) − (x ′1 − x1).
Hence, x ′2 ≥ x2.
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This argument can be repeated to find that x ′j ≥ x j ,∀ j < i . It follows that e′i ≥
ei ⇒ F(ω′) ≥ F(ω).
(c) Scale Invariance
We have to prove that Scale invariance of a bankruptcy rule implies Scale invariance
of its corresponding sequential sharing rule.
Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, and a related problem ω′ =
〈N , λe, λc〉, with λ > 0. In reduced problem ωi , by Scale invariance we obtain
E ′i = λ
(∑i−1
j=1(e j − x j ) + ei
)
= λEi . Again, by Scale Invariance this implies that
x ′i = λxi (and x ′Di = λxDi ). It follows that F(ω′) = λF(ω).
(d) Consistency
We have to prove that Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity of a bank-
ruptcy rule imply Consistency of its corresponding sequential sharing rule for some
feasible and efficient endowments vector e′.
Consider a river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉, and a related problem ω′ =〈
N ′, e′, c′
〉
such that N ′ = N\{ j}, c′ = c\{c j }, and e′ =
(
e′1, . . . , e′j−1, e′j+1, . . . , e′n
)
.
Denote by 
ei = e′i − ei ∀i ∈ N ′ the difference in endowments to agent i
between e and e′. Feasibility requires
∑
i≤k 
ei ≤ 0 ∀k < j . Efficiency requires∑
k∈N ′ 
ek = e j − x j .
To prove the proposition, we show how to construct the vector difference 
e, first
for the case where j = 1 and then for the case where j ≥ 2. Note that excess down-
stream claims may be lower in ω′ than in ω. Using (2), we have c′Di = cDi − c j +
e j − ∑ j+1k=i+1 
ek ∀i ≤ j − 1, so that c′Di ≤ cDi ∀i ≤ j − 1.
Suppose j = 1. By construction, x1 ≤ e1, so we can set 
e2 = e1 − x1. This gives
E ′2 = e2 + e1 − x1 = E2, while satisfying efficiency and feasibility, and we are done.
Suppose j ≥ 2. Consider the reduced problem ω′1. We have E ′1 = e1 +
e1 ≤ E1.
Because c′D1 ≤ cD1 , by Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity there exists

e1 ≤ 0 such that x ′1 = x1. Using this value of 
e1, we have x ′D1 = xD1 + 
e1.
Now, consider the reduced problem ω′2. We have E ′2 = e2 + 
e2 + x ′D1 = e2 +

e2 + xD1 + 
e1, and because of feasibility 
e2 ≤ −
e1, such that E ′2 ≤ E2.
Because c′D2 ≤ cD2 , by Claims Monotonicity and Resource Monotonicity there exists

e2 ≤ −
e1 such that x ′2 = x2. Using this value of 
e2, we have x ′D2 = xD2 +
e2.
The same argument can be repeated up to and including reduced problem ω′j−1.
Now, consider reduced problem ω′j+1. We have:
E ′j+1 = e j+1 + 
e j+1 + x ′D j−1
= e j+1 + 
e j+1 +
∑
k≤ j−1
(ek − xk + 
ek).
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We can set 
e j+1 = e j − x j − ∑k≤ j−1 (
ek). This gives:
E ′j+1 = e j+1 + e j − x j +
∑
k≤ j−1
(ek − xk) = E j+1.
while satisfying efficiency and feasibility and we are done. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof We prove each part of the proposition separately.
Part (a)
By Proposition 1, a sharing rule satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advanta-
geous Downstream Merging and Upstream Consistency if and only if it is a sequential
sharing rule. We therefore have to verify that a sequential sharing rule satisfies Location
Monotonicity if and only if it is based on PRO.
First we show that the sequential sharing rule based on PRO satisfies Location
Monotonicity. Recall from Definition 2 and the definition of PRO that xi = λci with
λ = pi = Ei/
(
ci + cDi
)
. We first show that Location Monotonicity is satisfied for
agents i and i + 1. We do so by contradiction. Suppose that ci = ci+1 but Fi (ω) >
Fi+1(ω) so that pi > pi+1. Then we have Ei/(ci + cDi ) > Ei+1/(ci+1 + cDi+1).
Substituting Ei+1 = Ei + ei+1 − xi and xi = ci Ei/(ci + cDi ), and re-ordering terms
gives:
ci+1 + cDi+1 >
(ci + cDi )(Ei + e j )
Ei
− ci .
Substituting ci+1 + cDi+1 = cDi + e j , re-ordering, and cancelling terms gives Ei >
ci + cDi , which contradicts Lemma 1. By transitivity of the order of agents, Location
Monotonicity is also satisfied for agents i and i + k ∀k > 1 when ci = ci+k .
Next we show that any sequential sharing rule that satisfies Location Monotonic-
ity is based on PRO. Consider river sharing problem ω = 〈N , e, c〉 and any two
agents i, j ∈ N such that i < j and ci = c j . By Location Monotonicity we have
Fi (ω) ≤ Fj (ω) so that given equal claims pi ≤ p j . Because the property holds for
any two agents with equal claims, this implies, using (2), that
xi
ci
≤
∑
j∈Di x j∑
j∈Di c j
= xDi
cDi +
∑
j∈Di e j
⇒ xi
ci
≤ xDi
cDi
.
Substituting xDi = Ei − xi and re-ordering terms gives
xi ≤ ci
ci + cDi
Ei . (A3)
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In words, the allocation to agent i is weakly smaller than the allocation provided by
PRO. By the efficiency requirement (b) of Definition 2, this implies that xDi is weakly
larger than the allocation provided by PRO. By the anonymity requirement (c) of Def-
inition 5, we know that the reverse is also true for both xi and xDi . Hence, (A3) holds
with equality, which is equivalent to the definition of PRO. This completes the proof
of part (a).
Part (b)
By Proposition 1, a sharing rule satisfies Only n’s Excess Claim Matters, No Advanta-
geous Downstream Merging and Upstream Consistency if and only if it is a sequential
sharing rule. We therefore have to verify that a sequential sharing rule satisfies Bank-
ruptcy Equivalence if and only if it is based on PRO.
First we show that the sequential sharing rule based on PRO satisfies Bankruptcy
Equivalence. This part of the proof is by induction. Recall from Definition 2 and
the definition of PRO that xi = λci with λ = pi = Ei/
(
ci + cDi
)
. For i = 1 we
have p1 = e1c1+cD1 =
e1∑
j∈N c j
so that F1(ω) = B1(ψ). The inductive step is to show
that pi = pi+1. We have (i) xDi = Eici +cDi cDi . Because ei = 0 ∀i > 1, by (1) we
have (ii) Ei+1 = xDi , and by (2) we have (iii) cDi = ci+1 + cDi+1 . Combining (ii)
and (iii), we have (iv) pi+1 = Ei+1ci+1+cDi+1 =
xDi
cDi
. Combining (i) and (iv), we obtain
pi+1 = Eici +cDi = pi so that Fi (ω) = Bi (ψ) ∀i ∈ N . Hence, the sequential sharing
rule based on PRO satisfies Bankruptcy Equivalence.
Next we show that any sequential sharing rule that satisfies Bankruptcy Equiv-
alence is based on PRO. Consider a river sharing problem with symmetric claims
c such that ωs = 〈N , (e1, 0, . . . , 0), (c, . . . , c)〉, and a sequential sharing rule F .
Now, consider a related problem ωr = 〈K , (e1, 0, . . . , 0), (c, n−1k−1 c, . . . , n−1k−1 c)〉, with
n = |N | = k = |K |. By construction, ωs and ωr have the same reduced game
ω1 = 〈{1, D1}, (e1, 0), (c, cD1〉 such that cD1 = (n − 1)ci = n−1k−1 (k − 1)c j . Let
x1 = F1(ωs1) = F1(ωr1). Because F is a sequential sharing rule, we also know that
x1 = F1(ωs) = F1(ωr ). By Bankruptcy Equivalence, because of symmetric claims,
and by the anonymity requirement (c) of Definition 5 we have F1(ωs) = · · · =
Fn(ωs) = 1n e1. For the same reason we must have F2(ωr ) = · · · = Fn(ωr ) and for
F2(ωr ) we obtain F2(ωr ) = (e1 − x1) 1k−1 . Substituting x1 = 1n e1 we have F2(ωr ) =
n−1
n
1
k−1 e1 =
(
n−1
k−1
)
1
n
e1 and F2(ωr ) must be proportional to claims. This argumenta-
tion can be repeated for any agent j = α+1 with any claim c′ = n−αk−α c by constructing
an appropriate related game ωr ′ = 〈K , (e1, 0, . . . , 0), (c, . . . , c, n−αk−α c . . . , n−αk−α c)〉.
This completes the proof of part (b). unionsq
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